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This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product
development.  Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other,
contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing
in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices.  First, effective coordination
may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity
results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of
non-contractible effort.  Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade
secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among
vertical integration choices.   We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting
by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting
environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment.  Using an instrumental
variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence
is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical
integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important
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The modern theory of the firm has made considerable progress in explaining the determinants of 
vertical integration and firm boundaries, assuming that the level of vertical integration results from 
independent transactional choices (Masten and Saussier, 2002; Richman and Macher, 2006).  For most 
organizations, however, firm boundaries are not determined by independent vertical integration decisions 
but depend on interrelated choices spanning functional activities (Holmstrom, 1999; Nickerson 1997).  
For example, in automobile product development, the degree of vertical integration for a single 
manufacturer is the consequence of hundreds of individual procurement choices, ranging from simple 
supply contracts for commodity components to complex arrangements for cutting-edge technology 
development.  If these individual contracting choices are interdependent with each other, the decision to 
outsource a single function (e.g., the supply for an individual component) impacts the vertical integration 
calculation for related procurement decisions.  This will be particularly true if overall performance 
depends on coordination among agents responsible for these functional areas and the degree of 
coordination is sensitive to governance structure. 
Interdependence among governance choices has important testable implications for patterns of 
vertical integration.  When the marginal returns to vertical integration for a given vertical integration 
choice are increasing in the level of vertical integration on related choices, there will be complementarity 
among governance choices, which we refer to as contracting complementarity.  The goals of this paper 
are to identify conditions under which contracting complementarity may be an important driver of vertical 
integration decisions, and to evaluate the empirical evidence for contracting complementarity in the 
context of automobile product development governance choices. 
Our analysis suggests that contracting complementarity arises when coordination is important to 
achieve but difficult to monitor.  Consider the coordination required between two automobile product 
development teams, each of which is responsible for one of two distinct “systems” (e.g., the engine 
system or the brake system).  While some incentives for coordination between the teams can be written 
into formal contracts, effective coordination requires non-contractible coordination effort by each team.   
The benefits from coordination are likely to depend on the level of interaction between the teams:  a high 
level of coordination effort by one team will be of little benefit unless reciprocated with effort by the 
other team.  In other words, coordination efforts are complements.  Moreover, while external teams may 
be more responsive than in-house teams to explicit incentives for system-specific performance, external 
teams may be less  effective than in-house teams in terms of devoting effort towards cross-system 
coordination (precisely because such effort is non-contractible).   If vertical integration in any one system 
induces a higher level of coordination effort by team members for that system, and the marginal returns to 
coordination effort is increasing in the level of coordination effort by other teams, the vertical integration  
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choices for each system will themselves be complements.  Trade secrecy concerns may also result in 
contracting complementarity.  While effective coordination requires disclosing strategic technical choices, 
such information may also result in expropriation if that knowledge leaks to competitors.  If the risk of 
expropriation is particularly salient with the first potential leakage of information (i.e., the first external 
contract), trade secrecy concerns may limit disclosure unless all development is maintained internally.   
More generally, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to vertical integration for any one 
system are increasing in the level of vertical integration on other systems. 
Our focus on interdependence among vertical integration choices differs from most theoretical 
and empirical research in economics, which often focuses on the drivers of vertical integration at the level 
of  transactions  (Williamson, 1979; Hart and Moore, 1990; Whinston, 2003).
1  In contrast, product 
development researchers have increasingly identified the interactions among components and systems as 
perhaps the most important “problem” in managing new product development (Eppinger, et al, 1994; 
Ulrich, 1995; Suh, 1999; Baldwin and Clark, 2000).  This literature emphasizes the role of interfaces and 
vertical integration for achieving effective coordination (Alexander, 1964; Suh, 1990; Ulrich and 
Eppinger, 1995).
2   Motivated by these insights from the product development literature, and our 
qualitative research on contracting practices in the automobile industry, this paper explores whether 
coordination requirements and the need to share knowledge across components and systems may result in 
complementarity across vertical integration choices. 
Our analysis of contracting complementarity exploits an original and detailed dataset covering 
luxury automobile models over a fifteen year period.  For each model, we observe both the degree of 
vertical integration and the contracting environment for seven distinct automobile systems (e.g., the brake 
system, the seat system, etc.).  Across different systems, we observe a similar set of system-specific 
vertical integration drivers.  For example, for each system, we observe whether the firm has existing in-
house sunk investments in plant and equipment.  Observing multiple system-specific measures allow us to 
develop and implement an instrumental variables strategy that overcomes several related problems in 
                                                 
1 See Masten and Saussier (2002) and Macher and Richman (2006) for recent surveys of the transaction cost 
economics literature, and Tirole (1999) for a survey of the incomplete contracting literature.  Empirical research has 
primarily focused on individual contracting opportunities in which individual decisions are assumed independent 
(e.g., Joskow, 1988; Baker and Hubbard, 2004).   In the context of product development, this approach has placed 
emphasis on individual components, examining how factors such as asset specificity or relative bargaining power 
shape contracting at the most “micro” level of decision-making (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Masten, 1984; 
Masten, Meehan and Snyder, 1991).  While we are not aware of prior studies of contracting complementarity, 
several recent papers highlight interrelationships in governance choice.  For example, building on Nickerson (1997), 
Nickerson and Silverman (2003) highlight the potential for spillovers across truckers taking orders from a single 
carrier, while Azoulay (2004) examines the potential for substitutability in drug development contracting choices 
and argues for a “portfolio” approach to empirical contract analysis. 
2 Though more abstract than this applied paper, Segal (1999) provides theoretical foundations for multi-lateral 
contracting choice, emphasizing the potential for signaling across contracting decisions.  
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testing for complementarity among organizational design choices.
3  An instrumental variables approach is 
required to disentangle contracting complementarity from unobservable firm-level fixed effects in 
contracting mode (e.g., if a firm adopts “outsourcing” across all systems in response to a fad).  We adapt 
the methodology proposed in Arora (1996) and Athey and Stern (2004) to exploit system-specific 
variation in the contracting environment within each automobile model.  In particular, we estimate the 
sensitivity of vertical integration on a system i to the level of vertical integration on other systems within 
that model by (a) including the system-specific measures for system i directly as control variables and (b) 
using the system-specific drivers for the other systems as instruments for the level of vertical integration 
on those other systems.  Of course, this approach requires that the system-specific measures are 
themselves exogenous.  While we do not observe a single unambiguous natural experiment, the richness 
of the dataset allows us to explore several alternative identification strategies.  In particular, we observe 
multiple observations for individual model-systems over time (i.e., we observe 2-4 system-specific 
observations per automobile model), and so we are able to focus exclusively on within-variation (i.e., 
changes in the contracting environment over time within a model-system), exclusively on between-
variation (e.g., variation in contracting choices across model-systems linked to variation in the initial 
contracting environment for each model-system), or allow for both sources of variation. Observing 
multiple system-specific drivers of vertical integration, and exploring whether the results depend on 
cross-sectional or time-series identification strategies, the core of the empirical strategy is based on 
assuming that we observe exogenous system-specific differences in the contracting environment which 
also result in differences in contracting choices. 
Our findings highlight the potential empirical importance of contracting complementarity.  First, 
using the instrumental variables strategy described above, the probability of vertical integration for each 
automobile system increases in share of other systems that are vertically integrated.  This finding is 
statistically and quantitatively significant, remains similar in magnitude whether we rely exclusively on 
time-series or cross-sectional variation (or both), and is robust to focusing exclusively on system-specific 
measures relating to pre-existing in-house capabilities/resources or exclusively focusing on measures 
related to the intensity of design and manufacturing challenges.  Additionally, the findings are most 
salient in environments where we expect contracting complementarity to be most important (e.g., among 
tightly coupled systems within the automobile).  Taken together, the evidence is suggestive of contracting 
complementarity rather than spurious correlation induced by company-level fixed effects in outsourcing.  
                                                 
3 A growing literature examines complementarity in organizational design more generally from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives, with several specific applications to the automobile industry (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Helper, 1995, 1997; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prenusshi, 1997; Cockburn, Henderson 
and Stern, 2003; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003; Van Biesebroeck, 2006; MacDuffie, 1995; Pil and MacDuffie, 1996).  
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While we interpret this evidence cautiously in light of the size of the dataset and the inherent 
challenges in assessing the drivers of organizational design, our results do suggest that assuming away 
contracting complementarity may be problematic in contexts where coordination activities are important 
yet difficult to monitor.  Contracting complementarity may have implications for aggregate patterns of 
vertical integration.  Consider how one might interpret the increased (and clustered) use of outsourcing.  
While most researchers interpret the increased use of outsourcing of non-core activities as a firm-level 
“strategy,” contracting complementarity suggests that a coordinated shift towards outsourcing might be 
the result of an unraveling process; under contracting complementarity, the benefits to vertical integration 
for individual functions depend on maintaining a vertically integrated structure across functions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section introduces a qualitative 
assessment of product development contracting choices in the automobile industry, and the potential for 
contracting complementarity in this environment.   Section III derives a formal empirical framework for 
testing for contracting complementarity.  After a review of the data in Section IV, Section V presents our 
empirical findings.  A final section concludes. 
II.  Interactions among Vertical Integration Choices in Automobile Product Development 
The Setting.
4 Automobile product development is among the most well-known settings to study 
the drivers of vertical integration and contracting, beginning with the classical GM-Fisher Body 
integration choice (Coase, 1937; Klein, et al, 1978; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Hart, 1995; Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Bigelow, 2003).  This is not surprising, as product development and 
governance choices reflect features of the contracting literature, including the importance of non-
contractible investment and the potential for renegotiation. 
While most empirical research in economics and strategy assesses the determinants of vertical 
integration at the level of individual transactions, coordinating activities across transactions is at the heart 
of automobile product development (Ulrich and Eppinger, 1995).  The organization of product 
development activities reflects the technical choices and interfaces of the vehicle itself.  After overall 
vehicle requirements and goals are chosen (e.g., building “the ultimate driving machine” or “the safest car 
on the road”), work is decomposed into requirements for each automobile system (e.g., engine 
horsepower, steering column adjustability).  These system requirements are then translated into needs for 
sub-systems or individual components (e.g., engine block characteristics, steering column characteristics). 
Though procurement takes place at the level of individual components (e.g., an engine block with 
a given specification can be made or bought), vehicle performance depends on effective coordination 
                                                 
4 This section is based on a detailed qualitative understanding of the drivers and impact of contracting and 
vertical integration in this setting, drawing on a multi-year study by one of the authors (Novak and Eppinger, 2001).   
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among components and between systems, and performance is only observed after a long lag.  For 
example, in the event of a crash, safety performance depends on seamless integration between the engine, 
braking and steering systems; as a result, design decisions for the engine block must be coordinated with 
design decisions in the braking and steering systems.  Realized performance of each system will only be 
observed after the vehicle goes into production, on average five years after the initiation of product 
development (Novak and Klibanoff, 2004).  
Automobile manufacturers achieve this coordination in several ways.  First, product development 
is typically governed by a “vehicle integrity” team, which has responsibility for monitoring and ensuring 
cross-system coordination throughout the automobile.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, direct 
coordination among individuals responsible for different components or systems is achieved through 
repeated and ongoing exchanges of information, such as technical requirements for interacting parts or 
software specifications impacting multiple vehicle systems.  In some cases, effective integration requires 
updating information on even a daily basis.  While coordination activities have always been crucial, their 
importance across vehicle systems has increased dramatically over the past twenty years, with the 
introduction of advanced electronics that impact multiple systems, such as electronic engine controllers, 
antilock brake systems (ABS), or electronic features such as anti-whiplash protection.  
Our goal is to examine how the inability to contract on the level of effort devoted to coordination 
across systems limits the effectiveness of coordination efforts, particularly when contracting with external 
parties. We begin by describing the challenges of contracting for cross-system coordination effort, and 
how secrecy concerns in product development can similarly reduce such effort.  We then outline how 
these forces can result in complementarity across vertical integration choices. 
Cross-System Coordination Effort.  Effective vehicle performance requires substantial 
investments in coordination across individual components and systems.  However, contracting on the 
level of effort devoted towards coordination is costly and difficult to enforce.  For example, while 
contracting in terms of specification ranges is feasible (e.g., the gear box for the transmission system must 
be 12cm wide plus or minus 2 cm), it is difficult to write and enforce contracts which assign 
responsibility for resolving system-to-system mismatches (e.g., ensuring that the allowable range of 
gearbox parameters is adjusted when the body dimensions are also at the high end of a given range).  This 
is because the benefits to coordination depend on effort by all parties involved, but a higher probability of 
failure results from shirking by even one agent.   Moreover, the performance consequences of insufficient 
coordination can rarely be assigned to any one individual or unit (any one party can blame “failure to 
coordinate” on every other party involved), a problem that is compounded by the fact that failure is often 
observed only with a long lag (often after the product is commercially introduced).  Consequently, while 
procurement contracts with external suppliers specify that coordination activities must be undertaken, the  
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inability to assign responsibility for coordination failure makes such provisions essentially unenforceable. 
In most cases, the inability to enforce formal contract terms relating to coordination limits the 
effectiveness of formal contracts in inducing effort towards coordination, and suggests that the 
coordination effort by external suppliers will likely be lower than that achieved by an internal team.   
First, since the vehicle integrity team is internal to the firm, members of these teams are at a higher level 
in the organizational hierarchy and so have (formal) authority over internal system engineers (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991); in contrast, external suppliers are less constrained by the authority relationships within 
the manufacturer’s organization.  While internal teams can be focused exclusively on a single project 
(allowing time for investments in coordination activities), suppliers often work on multiple projects, and 
it is difficult for the manufacturer to observe the precise allocation of time to individual projects.  Second, 
while supplier incentives are closely linked to the verifiable terms of formal contracts, internal teams may 
be able to be monitored and provided effective subjective performance incentives (Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1994; 2002).  For example, while the observed seat defect rate is a measure that a seat supplier 
may agree to incorporate into a contract, a seat supplier likely will not contract on qualitative customer 
satisfaction ratings (in part, because the manufacturer may distort such data to lower payments).  The use 
of subjective performance signals can be achieved through direct compensation, subjective bonuses, and 
promotion incentives.  While reputational mechanisms can also be used to encourage external suppliers, 
relational contracting incentives will be more salient for internal employees who have a long-lived 
relationship with a single firm.  Finally, ensuring a given level of coordination is often easier in the 
context of internal development, where product development teams are more likely to be co-located and 
share a common language and background (Ulrich, 1995).  Together, these factors suggest that the 
coordination effort by external suppliers will likely be lower than that achieved by an internal team. 
Consider the case of rollovers and tire blowout incidents on the Ford Explorer that was traced to 
the interaction between Ford and its tire supplier, Firestone (Kumar, 2001; Kalogeridis, 2005).  While 
both Ford and Firestone successfully completed the design and production responsibilities laid out in their 
contract, the parties were not able to effectively manage the interface between their responsibilities. That 
is, while the tires were within contractually specified maximum and minimum tire inflation specifications 
and the vehicle body was within maximum and minimum weight specifications, the accidents resulted 
from a complex interaction between vehicle and tire that neither Ford nor Firestone had considered.  
When asked about the vehicle failures, Firestone spokeswoman Jill Bratina said. "The vehicle is beyond 
our area of expertise,” and a Ford spokesman stated, “This is a tire issue, not a vehicle issue." (Kumar, 
2001).   At least in part, this coordination problem was exacerbated by the fact that Ford was unable to 
manage system-to-system coordination activities with Firestone as effectively as they might had tire 
design and supply been maintained in-house.  Had tire development and body development been in-house  
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at Ford, effective coordination would have unambiguously been a “Ford” issue. Simply put, the ability to 
coordinate between systems was reduced by outsourcing.  While the resultant safety hazard was likely an 
extreme case, Ford/Firestone highlights the role of coordination among systems in product development. 
Trade Secrecy. Trade secrecy concerns also limit the effectiveness of coordination efforts across 
components and systems within an automobile.  Automobile manufacturers expend substantial resources 
on maintaining design and technology choices as secrets during the product development stage.  For 
example, for most companies, product development for each system occurs within a secure facility, and 
system-specific or even component-specific access codes are required to access specific areas or 
computer databases.   When a system is outsourced, it is more likely that trade secrets will leak.  Not 
necessarily as a direct consequence of explicit industrial espionage, knowledge about new innovations or 
design initiatives can inadvertently be revealed to competitors when external suppliers exploit knowledge 
gained in one partnership in bidding on future projects.  For example, in the 2001 lawsuit between 
Daimler-Chrysler and General Motors, Daimler charged that the GM Hummer H2 grille was “borrowed” 
from the Jeep design (Kiley, 2001; respondent interviews).  The Hummer grille was designed by AM 
General.  AM General received a trademark for the grille in 1996, when it was exclusively designing for 
Jeep.  General Motors signed an agreement with AM General in 1999 to develop and build vehicles based 
on the Hummer design. The lawsuit was based on the argument that Chrysler’s outsourcing of Jeep grilles 
to AM General resulted in the design being passed on to General Motors, in violation of Jeep intellectual 
property.  While it is possible to “copy” designs by reverse-engineering or benchmarking, a supplier can 
pass on detailed information such as effective design of distinctive characteristics (such as the sharp edges 
of the Jeep grille) through related experience on other projects. In the case of the Jeep lawsuit, a study 
alleged "Nearly two-thirds of all Jeep Grand Cherokee and Jeep Cherokee owners ... incorrectly 
associated the new H2 grille with a DaimlerChrysler.” (Kiley, 2001). 
Trade secrecy concerns place restrictions on effective design integration when product 
development is outsourced through a substantial reduction in the amount and frequency of information 
that can be exchanged among developers.  Whereas internal product development groups can (mostly) 
exchange information about design details freely, external suppliers may expose highly confidential trade 
secrets, and so manufacturers place additional limits on their access to pieces of information.
5   Cross-
system coordination requires disclosure of design details for each system; limiting the release of technical 
details because of trade secrecy concerns reduces the ability to coordinate systems during product 
development.
6 
                                                 
5 For example, “early” spy photos of vehicles in development are highly sought after by trade publications, and 
suppliers have been sued for using their access to cause competitive harm through trade secrecy violations.  
6 Though long-term exclusive contracts might mitigate such concerns, such arrangements are rare in the automobile 
industry, as a principal benefit of organizing as an independent supplier is the ability to leverage investments across  
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Since effective integration requires the disclosure of design choices, manufacturers working with 
external suppliers face the risk of innovations being revealed to competitors before vehicles are 
introduced to the market.
7   Consider the case of cellular telephones (respondent interviews).  In the 
luxury car market, a design challenge has been the integration of the cellular telephone sub-system into 
the audio system.  In an integrated design, the cellular telephone would share a circuit board and control 
panel with the audio system, and these would interface with the antennas, speakers, and microphone.  In 
contrast, a modular design would maintain the cell phone’s circuitry as separate from the audio system.   
This facilitates outsourcing production of the cellular telephone components, with little overlap between 
manufacturer and supplier during product development.  While the integrated design has several 
performance and cost advantages, such as better sound quality and less bulk, the integrated design would 
also require extensive disclosure by the auto manufacturer to the cellular telephone supplier during 
product development.  For example, an integrated design would reveal to the supplier whether a Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”) was also included, while a modular design need not result in this disclosure.  
When considering whether to choose the integrated or modular design, the manufacturer must trade off 
the benefits to coordination with the potential costs of disclosure of proprietary design decisions. 
Complementarity among Vertical Integration Decisions.   While our discussion so far has focused 
on how trade secrecy concerns and cross-system coordination impact the returns to outsourcing on a 
single system, we now examine how these issues result in interdependence among outsourcing choices 
(i.e., complementarity among vertical integration choices among systems in product development).
8  Let 
us first consider the role of cross-system coordination effort.  Consistent with our qualitative discussion, 
suppose that (a) cross-system coordination effort is non-contractible and (b) the returns to coordination 
effort by workers associated with one system is higher if the level of coordination effort by workers on 
other systems is higher.  Moreover, suppose that the level of coordination effort elicited under in-house 
governance is higher than under outsourcing, perhaps because of the ability to provide subjective 
incentives for coordination to in-house workers.  Finally, while the level of cross-system coordination 
effort is important, each governance choice is additionally impacted by factors shifting the returns to 
vertical integration independent of other systems.  Then, vertical integration on any one system will be a 
complement to the level of vertical integration on any other system.  An increase in the idiosyncratic 
                                                                                                                                                             
projects for multiple firms.  Indeed, while some expropriation may be intentional and violate confidentiality 
agreements, most information leaks occur because suppliers advertise the innovations developed in an ongoing 
project in their bids for new projects with other manufacturers. 
7 Secrecy is particularly important since competitive advantage in the automobile industry depends, in large part, on 
earning “transitory” advantage on innovations during the period in which other firms “catch up” as they imitate 
value-enhancing new features and performance improvements. 
8 In Appendix A, we develop a simple formal model in which coordination effort and/or trade secrecy concerns 
results in complementarity among vertical integration choices, which we summarize in this sub-section.  
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returns to vertical integration for one system (e.g., an increase in system-specific capabilities) will not 
only raise the marginal returns for in-house contracting for that system, but will have a spillover effect on 
other systems for the same automobile.  For example, the vertical integration of engine system 
components is highly dependent on the internal capabilities of a given manufacturer (some such as Honda 
are highly skilled in this area, others less so); when these capabilities allow for vertical integration in that 
system, this also greatly facilitates coordination of engine development with those of other systems such 
as the body and transmission.  For example, Honda has been able to support a wider range of 
engine/transmission combinations in the Acura Legend than competitors, through intense coordination 
between its internal engine, transmission, and body teams (respondent interviews). 
A related argument suggests that trade secrecy concerns can also result in complementarity 
among governance choices.  Suppose that outsourcing any single system enhances the risk of loss from 
disclosure of trade secrecy, and the marginal (expected) losses from disclosure of additional systems are 
declining.  In other words, while outsourcing a single system entails a significant disclosure cost (perhaps 
because of the need to develop systems or infrastructure to protect information), the incremental 
disclosure costs arising from outsourcing are lower.  When the marginal costs of disclosure are declining 
in the level of outsourcing, the marginal returns to vertical integration on any one system are higher when 
a related system is already vertically integrated. For example, as in the cellular phone case discussed 
above, if an integrated solution has already been shared with an external supplier, thereby revealing the 
inclusion of GPS technology, further outsourcing of related systems will not further compromise 
information already revealed about this proprietary feature.  
Both the ability to induce coordination effort and the economics of disclosure costs imply 
complementarity among vertical integration choices, motivating the central hypothesis of the paper:  the 
level of vertical integration on any one automobile system will be sensitive to the level of vertical 
integration on other automobile systems, and a shift in the system-specific returns to vertical integration 
for one system will have a spillover effect onto other systems within the same automobile model.  The 
remainder of the paper develops and implements an approach for evaluating the contracting 
complementarity hypothesis in the context of automobile product development. 
III.  The Empirical Framework 
To test for the presence of contracting complementarity, we build on a recent applied 
econometrics literature that offers an approach for distinguishing complementarity from extraneous “firm-
level” factors driving correlated adoption across distinct choices (Arora, 1996; Athey and Stern, 2004).   
We begin by developing this empirical framework, adapt that framework to the specifics of the empirical 
setting, and then discuss checks for the assumptions underlying the identification strategy.  
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Suppose there are two observable vertical integration choices, YA and YB, and the separable 
benefits (and costs) to vertical integration observable to the firm can be decomposed into two distinct 
parts.  Both the firm and the econometrician observe a set of system-specific vertical integration drivers 
(ZA, ZB), and  η = (ηA, ηB) is a vector of the choice-specific mean-zero shocks observed by the firm but 
unobservable to the econometrician.  The elements of η may be correlated; for simplicity, we assume a 
firm-level mean-zero “fixed effect” (ξ) which impacts the overall propensity of the firm to vertically 
integrate (i.e., for a given system i and firm j, ,, ij j ij η ξε = + ). Finally, suppose that the returns to each 
choice are interdependent:  the marginal returns to vertical integration for YA depend on whether the firm 
vertically integrates into YB.  We assume this interdependence term,λ, is constant across firms all firms.
9  
The firm optimizes across its choices of YA and YB, yielding the following maximization problem: 
 
,,
,, , , , , , , , (*) ( ) ( )
jA A BB B
Aj Bj
j Aj Bj Y YZ Aj Aj Aj Y YZ Bj Bj Bj YY Max f Y Y ZY ZY λ ββ η ββ η =+ + + + + +  (1) 
To understand the relationship between performance, optimal choice behavior, and estimation, 
consider the adoption condition for each practice:   
,, , , , 1( ) 0
j ij ij j i iZ ij ij Yi f Y Z λ ξβ β ε − =+ + + + >       ( 2 )  
A firm’s choice of integration on Yi depends on the firm’s vertical integration decision on Y-i, the 
observable choice-specific drivers, Zi,j, and the stochastic components, ξj and εij.  λ can be interpreted as 
the degree of complementarity (or substitutability if λ < 0) between YA and YB, and ξj is an unobserved 
firm-level effect which (spuriously) induces correlation among the firm’s decision regarding YA and YB.
10    
The empirical objective is to estimate the parameters of the “organizational design production function,” 
focusing on λ, the contracting complementarity parameter.   Consider the linear probability model: 
,, , , i ij i j ij Z ij ij YY Z α γλ β η − =++ + +         ( 3 )  
The probability that Y-i = 1 is increasing in ξ, so  (* ) (* )0 ii i EY EY η ξ −− = > , and so an OLS 
estimate of (3) will be biased upward due to an omitted variables problem.  At the same time, Y-i may 
suffer from measurement error, particularly if Y-i is constructed as an imperfect index of more fine-
grained vertical integration decisions (as it does in our context).  The presence of measurement error can 
lead to attenuation bias, resulting in a downward OLS bias.  Whether from an omitted variables problem 
or from measurement error,  ˆ
OLS λ will be a biased estimate of the sensitivity of the vertical integration 
choice Y-i on Yi.  However, an instrumental variables estimator can provide a consistent estimate of λ, if 
                                                 
9 In line with the model, λ is a function of the benefits from coordination effort and the reduced probability of 
disclosure.  This parameter combines the impact of these distinct mechanisms. 
10 ξ need not be related to performance, and could reflect fads or managerial preferences for outsourcing.  
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the econometrician observes measures correlated with the vertical integration decision on Y-i but 
independent of η.   Our framework yields a natural set of instruments:  for each choice i, Z-i – factors 
driving the adoption of Y-i but uncorrelated with ηi – are potential instruments to examine the relationship 
between  Y-i on Yi.    For Z-i to be valid instrumental variables, we assume that, conditional on all 
observables,  () ( ) 0 ii i EZ EZ η ξ −− == .  As emphasized by Arora (1996) and Athey and Stern (2004), 
disentangling complementarity from common shocks that raise the propensity to adopt multiple practices 
requires a choice-specific instrumental variables framework that addresses omitted variables and 
measurement error in a single framework.
11 
Our dataset includes choice-specific measures.   We observe data for 19 distinct automobile 
model-generations, where each model-generation corresponds to a major revision for an overall 
automobile model (we observe each model between two and four times over our sample).  For each 
model-generation, we observe the level of vertical integration and drivers of vertical integration at the 
level of individual automobile systems (e.g., engines, brakes, etc.).  These measures are thus specific to 
each system and independently observed across multiple systems.  For example, on a system-specific 
basis, we observe whether the firm has existing in-house sunk investments in plant and equipment and 
adequate manufacturing capacity.  Suppose that these system-specific measures of sunk assets and 
available capacity are exogenous determinants of system-level vertical integration (an assumption we 
discuss below).  In our equation for vertical integration for system i, we can then simultaneously control 
for the level of sunk assets and capacity constraints on system i, and use the level of sunk assets and 
capacity constraints on system -i as instrumental variables for vertical integration level for system -i. 
This instrumental variables approach is premised on two conditions.  First, it requires variation 
across systems and within model-generations in the system-specific drivers of vertical integration.   For 
example, if the only system-specific driver was a single measure of capacity constraints, and there was no 
variation across systems (within a model-generation), the measure of vertical integration for system –i 
(instrumented with the measure of capacity constraints for system –i) would not be separately identified 
from the measure of capacity constraints for system i.  Since the identification strategy depends on 
system-specific differences in the contracting environment which also result in differences in contracting 
choices, Section IV presents evidence of variation across systems but within model-generation.  The 
second requirement of the empirical framework is that the system-specific drivers are exogenous.  Two 
distinct issues arise.  First, the framework assumes that Zi is uncorrelated with ηi – the observed system-
                                                 
11 In the large literature evaluating the potential for complementarity among organizational design choices (see 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003)), only a small number of recent papers have addressed the omitted variables problem 
directly by adopting a choice-specific instrumental variables framework (Miravete and Pernias, 2006; van 
Biesebroeck, 2006).  See also Cassiman and Veugelers (2007) for an alternative approach.     
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specific drivers of vertical integration are independent of the idiosyncratic returns to vertical integration.   
Of course, similar to many papers exploiting real data from organizations, the potential for endogeneity is 
real.  It is possible that firms with a high realization of ηi will choose activities that raise the measured 
level of Zi.  For example, if a firm expects that a particular system is likely to be outsourced in the future, 
they might limit physical investment and internal capacity.
12  Second, even if the system-specific drivers 
were exogenous to each vertical integration equation, our instrumental variables approach requires that, 
conditional on the system-specific drivers for system i, the system-specific drivers for system –i are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved returns to vertical integration for system i (i.e.,  (| ) 0 ii i EZ Z η − =   ).   
For example, if the level of sunk assets on any one system is informative about the total extent of sunk 
assets available across all systems (as might occur if the level of sunk assets are correlated across systems 
and there is measurement error at the system-specific level), the proposed instrumental variables estimator 
could be biased. 
We address the potential for bias in several ways.  First, in Section IV, we build on our qualitative 
knowledge to evaluate the potential for endogeneity for each system-specific measure.  Though no single 
measure offers an unambiguous natural experiment, different measures likely mitigate different sources of 
potential bias, and we examine the robustness of our findings to alternative specifications for Zi.  Second, 
we exploit the sensitivity of our results to exploiting two distinct sources of variation in our data:  across 
automobile models, and across generations of a given automobile model.  While some system-specific 
measures exhibit significant variation across manufacturers but are fixed over time (e.g., the presence of 
sunk investments), other system-specific measures exhibit significant variation across time within model-
systems (e.g., the degree of technological complexity for a given model-generation).   
These separate sources of variation facilitate more focused identification approaches.  If time-
series variation in the system-specific contracting environment is uncorrelated with changes in the 
unobserved returns to vertical integration, λ can be identified by relying exclusively on variation within 
automobile models over time.  Adapting (3) to allow for multiple generations (t) of a given automobile 
model  j, we can specify an instrumental variables estimator with fixed effect for each model-system: 
,, , ,, ,, ,, i ijt ij t ijt Z ijt ijt YY Z α δλ β η − =+ + + +       ( 4 )  
Z-i,j,t are the (excluded) instruments for Y-i,j,t:: conditional on a complete set of model-system and 
generation fixed effects, (4) relies on variation in the contracting environment (over time but within 
                                                 
12 Indeed, it is possible that the current values of Zi will directly reflect prior vertical integration choices (e.g., the 
decision to outsource in one period leads to constrained capacity in a subsequent period).  In this case, Zi  will be a 
function of the lagged endogenous variable, Yi(-1).  As discussed below, we account for this possibility directly, by 
comparing our results using a fixed effects IV approach, a first-differencing IV approach, and an initial conditions 
IV approach (see Table 3 and Appendix C).  
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model-systems) resulting in variation in vertical integration choices (over time but within model-
systems).
13 
Alternatively, if the system-specific differences across automobile models are determined by 
circumstances independent of current vertical integration decisions, a consistent estimate of λ can be 
identified by relying exclusively on differences across automobile models.   In particular, we can identify 
the interdependence among systems by relying exclusively on differences across different model-systems: 
  ,, , , i ij j ij Z ij ij YY Z γ λβ η − =+ + +        ( 5 )  
where  , ij Z−  are the (excluded) instruments for  , ij Y− .
14  By assuming that the variation across firms in 
their contracting environment are independent of the idiosyncratic returns to vertical contracting over 
time, this estimator is identified by the presence of variation across different automobile models and 
across systems within automobile models. 
  Finally, we can also implement a reduced-form strategy in the spirit of Arora (1996), where we 
include both the system-specific drivers (Zi,j,t) of vertical integration as well as the system-specific drivers 
of other systems within the same automobile model (Z-i,j,t): 
    ,, ,, ,, ,, ii ijt i j t Z ijt Z ijt ijt YZ Z α γδθ θ ε −− =+++ + +        ( 6 )  
Because our dataset includes (a) similar measures of the contracting environment for each system, and (b) 
we control for the system-specific drivers in our analysis, the identification in this paper results from 
measured differences in the contracting environment across systems within a given automobile model.  
The reduced-form approach highlights this feature; if the correlation was driven by similarities in the 
environment across systems, then the instrumental variables would be collinear with the system-specific 
direct effects included in each model (i.e.,  0 :0
i Z H θ− = ). 
  Our empirical work explores each of these approaches, evaluating how our results differ when 
employing estimators that rely on both cross-sectional and time-series variations or focus exclusively on 
one dimension or the other.  By comparing results across alternative strategies, we obtain a more 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, we can implement (4) in first-differences:
,, ,, ,, ,, i t ij t ij t ij t ij t Z YY Z δ λβ η − Δ =Δ + Δ + Δ +Δ  
This specification relies exclusively on variation in the contracting environment and vertical integration levels 
across adjacent product generations, and, by clustering the standard errors at the model-system level, treats serial 
correlation within model-systems.  Unfortunately, due to our small sample size (and the fact that we observe exactly 
two model-generations for several models), implementing a more efficient Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM panel 
data estimator results in dropping more than 50% of our sample.  Consequently, we limit our analysis to the 
traditional first-differences IV estimator rather than the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
14 Alternatively, we can implement an initial conditions model, relying exclusively on variation in the initial 
contracting environment across different automobile models.   Assuming that variation in the initial contracting 
environment is independent of the idiosyncratic returns to vertical integration over time, we can estimate 
,, ,, ,, 0 ,, i i jt j t i jt Z i j i jt YY Z γ δλ β η − =++ + +  , where Z-i,j,0 are the (excluded) instruments for Y-i,j,t.  
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complete assessment of the robustness of our results to alternative potential sources of endogeneity.   
Moreover, since we observe multiple system-specific measures, we are able to perform a number of 
specification tests, including a Hausman test of the exclusion restrictions imposed by our IV estimator. 
Implementing these approaches requires adapting the framework to our application.  First, while 
several of the examples in Section II focused on interactions within automobile systems, our empirical 
focus is on system-to-system interactions; though more aggregated than the case studies, this is the best 
feasible alternative, since we only observe variation in the contracting environment at the system level.  
Second, for each automobile model-generation, we observe seven different automobile systems; rather 
than estimate the potential for complementarity between system pairs, we adapt the framework to 
evaluate sensitivity of vertical integration on any one system to the “average” level of vertical integration 
on all other systems within that automobile-generation.
15  Third, while we observe instrumental variables 
at the level of automobile systems (e.g., the brake system, the engine system, etc.), our measure of vertical 
integration (in-house or external supplier) is at a more fine-grained component level (e.g., the gearbox, 
the cylinder head, etc.).  To accommodate this imbalance, we average the component decisions on each 
system for each model to calculate the degree of vertical integration for each model-system (the resulting 
integration measure thus varies between 0 and 1).  
Finally, this framework allows us to evaluate whether the degree of complementarity varies with 
observable factors, focusing on two types of interaction effects.  First, we consider whether the degree of 
complementarity is higher in environments where the returns to coordination and/or secrecy may be 
particularly high.  For example, we observe whether the firm designates a system for “high” performance, 
in which the returns to coordination with other systems may be reduced.   To test this hypothesis, we 
interact this “high performance” measure with Y-i, and construct additional instruments by interacting this 
measure with Z-i.   Second, we consider whether complementarity among systems is particularly high 
among systems that are tightly coupled in terms of design and coordination requirements.   Using our 
qualitative knowledge, we group each system-to-system pair as a “high” or “low” interaction, and 
evaluate a separate parameter for the sensitivity of vertical integration decisions among systems within 
these two groups (i.e., are vertical integration choices that are rated to be highly interdependent more 
sensitive to each other?).  By extending our framework to evaluate whether the salience of contracting 
complementarity varies with the product development environment, we are able to provide a more careful 
assessment of the sources and nature of contracting complementarity in our empirical environment. 
                                                 
15 To do so, we first calculate, for each system, the sum of vertical integration for other systems on that automobile 
model.  We then adapt our instrumental variables strategy by calculating the sum of Z-i for each observation, 
yielding instruments for Y-i in the empirical analysis.  
15 
IV. The  Data 
Sample and Methods.  This paper uses a proprietary and original dataset based on a multi-year 
study of contracting and product architecture in the global auto industry.  We study luxury performance 
cars (defined by Consumer Reports as vehicles priced above $30,000 in 1995) and the companies in the 
sample are drawn from Europe, the U.S. and Japan, accounting for roughly 90% of revenues in the global 
luxury performance market.  As these are flagship vehicles developed in different environments over 
time, wide variation in contracting practices (and the contracting environment) was expected.  By 
focusing on a single vehicle segment, we limit the measurement problems arising from combining 
information from different vehicle types. 
The unit of analysis is an automotive system for a model-generation, where a model-generation is 
linked to the major model change for a given automobile model.   For each model-generation, we observe 
information for seven systems:  engine, transmission, body, electrical, suspension, steering, and brakes.  
For each of these systems, we observe information for nineteen model-generations, covering a fifteen year 
window for seven models.
16  The data were collected through on-site interviews with over 1000 people, 
including CEOs, chief engineers, project managers and the system engineers involved in the development 
of each model-generation.
17 
Data was collected through interviews conducted on-site at each company. To ensure accuracy, 
interviewees were given an overview of the research project, definitions for terms and a list of questions 
pertaining to the design and sourcing of components within their respective systems. The questions 
focused on objective information (e.g. number of parts in the body side) so as to minimize the likelihood 
of response bias.  The overall sample is composed of 133 model-generation-system observations.  Table 1 
provides variable names, definitions, and summary statistics (Appendix B provides pairwise correlations). 
Contracting Variables.  The dependent variable is VERTICAL INTEGRATION, the percentage 
of the system produced in-house, with 1 indicating in-house production of all components within that 
system.  For each component, system, vehicle model, and generation, we collected data on the make / buy 
outcome.  VERTICAL INTEGRATION at the system level is calculated as the average across the 
individual components for that system, with each component weighted equally.
18  VERTICAL 
                                                 
16 The coverage is between 1980 and 1995, and each of the model-generations are observed at (roughly) five-year 
intervals, depending on the rhythm of product development for each manufacturer.  Relative to the initial data 
collection (Novak and Eppinger, 2001), we drop one automobile model due to lack of comprehensive data. 
17 All participants were assured that only aggregate data would be presented, and confidentiality agreements were 
signed with each company.All interviewees were given the option of being interviewed in their native languages. 
Professor Kentaro Nobeoka graciously provided Japanese interview interpretation. 
18 Parts supplied by wholly-owned subsidiaries, such as the Delphi division of General Motors, are treated as in-
house. Parts produced by partially owned suppliers, such as Nippondenso (Toyota group), were treated as outside 
suppliers. Our core findings are robust whether we define partially owned suppliers as in-house or external.  
16 
INTEGRATION exhibits substantial variation across the sample, ranging from 0 (fully outsourced) to 1 
(in-house production), with a mean of .48 and a standard deviation of .32.  Moreover, much of this 
variation is “model-specific.”  Figure A plots 90% confidence intervals for VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
for each of the 19 model-years in the sample.
19  Relative to the variation in means across models, there is 
significantly less variation within most models.  In an OLS regression of VERTICAL INTEGRATION on 
individual model-year dummies, R
2 = 0.58, most model-year effects are individually significant, and the 
overall F-test statistic is highly significant at 8.74.  VERTICAL INTEGRATION is “clustered” according 
to model-year; our empirical approach disentangles whether this clustering is due to complementarity or 
results from unobservable “fixed effects” in governance. 
We also calculate VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i, which is the sum of VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION across all other systems within that model.  Consistent with the empirical framework, 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i will be treated through the bulk of the analysis as endogenous; we 
calculate the instruments for VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i from within-model-generation variation in 
the system-specific contracting environment. 
System-Specific Contracting Environment Measures.  The identification strategy utilizes four 
system-specific measures of the contracting environment.  Each of these variables is measured at the 
model-system level, can vary across systems within a given model-generation, and shifts the relative 
returns to vertical integration at the system level.  These measures allow us, in principle, to control for the 
system-specific contracting environment (Zi,j,t) and calculate instruments, within each model- generation, 
for VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i,j,t (Z-i,j,t).  Our empirical approach depends on combining our 
qualitative knowledge of these system-specific contracting measures with the empirical approaches 
outlined in Section III. 
The dataset includes two different types of system-specific measures:  factors relating to pre-
existing in-house capabilities/resources (SUNK COSTS and LOW CAPACITY), and factors relating to 
the intensity of design and manufacturing challenges (COMPLEXITY and PLATFORM).  We begin with 
the measures related to the level of pre-existing capabilities.  LOW CAPACITY is a dummy variable 
indicating that, prior to contracting, the level of in-house capacity is insufficient to manufacture the 
system in-house (mean = 0.17).  If a certain system, like a one-piece body side, exceeds the capacity of 
current plant equipment, the relative returns to outsourcing are increased.  For this reason, we predict a 
negative relationship between VERTICAL INTEGRATION and LOW CAPACITY.   
SUNK COST is a dummy variable indicating whether there is pre-existing in-house sunk 
investments for each system (mean = 0.13).  Specifically, managers were asked whether or not existing 
                                                 
19 Confidentiality issues prohibit us from reporting exact levels and dispersion of vertical integration for individual 
manufacturers.  
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plant equipment directly affected their design choices for the system, as systems are often designed 
around plant-specific process equipment investments.  Overall, the existence of pre-existing in-house 
capital investment will tend to favor a positive relationship between VERTICAL INTEGRATION and 
SUNK COST at the system level. 
Turning to factors related to system-specific design and technology choice, PLATFORM is a 
dummy variable equal to one for models with platform requirements where the component was designed 
to be used by more than one vehicle.  Platform requirements could support in-house production through 
economies of scale achieved through parts sharing.  For this reason, we expect a positive relationship 
between PLATFORM and VERTICAL INTEGRATION.    
As well, the degree of system-specific complexity should be positively related to VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION.  As developed in Novak and Eppinger (2001), the degree of system-level complexity 
will impact the need for coordination across component elements of the system, encouraging in-house 
contracting.  Our measure of system complexity draws on several measures, based on detailed system 
design and manufacturing data.  For each system, we estimate product complexity on a scale from 0 to 1 
(no complex system interactions to high product complexity) based on an unweighted average of 
characteristics of design complexity.
20  For some systems, measures include characteristics such as 
“newness” - the degree to which a design configuration has been used in the company and in the vehicle. 
For example, product complexity in the suspension system is calculated as an unweighted average of 
three (0-1) measures: newness of the design, number of moving parts in the suspension and whether the 
suspension is active or passive (Novak and Eppinger, 2001).  The measure COMPLEXITY (mean = .41) 
is the result of applying this procedure for each component within each system. 
Exogeneity of the System-Specific Contracting Environment Measures.  Ideally, variation in the 
contracting environment (i.e., variation in each of these four measures) would result from strictly 
exogenous shocks (e.g., unanticipated demand shocks for vehicle models in unrelated segments that share 
facilities with the luxury models).  While we do not observe an unambiguous natural experiment, our 
assumption that these system-specific measures are exogenous reflects several related aspects of the 
contracting environment, our dataset, and our econometric approach. 
First, our qualitative knowledge of the contracting environment suggests that we can (at least in 
part) exploit the path-dependent nature of vertical integration choices and the relative independence 
managers had during the time of our sample period over individual contracting choices.  From an 
historical perspective, investments in sunk assets and production capacity are made many years (perhaps 
decades) in advance of individual model-generation contracting choices (e.g., Ford has maintained 
multiple engine plants continuously since the 1940s) and design and technology choices are made well in 
                                                 
20 Each system-specific complexity measure is based on system engineering principles (Novak and Eppinger, 2001).  
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advance of the vertical integration choices for individual components within individual systems, primarily 
based on factors unrelated to vertical integration.  For example, while GM’s commitment to develop anti-
lock braking systems in 1980 greatly increased the complexity associated with their braking systems 
throughout the 1990s, this technology commitment was made well in advance of information about 
opportunities for contracting with specific external suppliers for this system.
21   Historical factors are 
particularly significant when relying on variation across automobile manufacturers, rather than within 
model-systems over time.  Additionally, during our sample period, individual managers maintained a high 
level of discretion over the outsourcing choice at the component (or, at most, system) level, and managers 
were able to vertically integrate or not in response to idiosyncratic circumstances.
22   For example, a 
component-level manager had the latitude to choose a specific supplier (over an in-house option) based 
on that supplier’s component-specific reputation or skills (respondent interview).  Of course, the fact that 
the system-specific contracting measures are determined in advance of the contracting choice and 
managers maintain discretion over this choice does not ensure exogeneity.  Instead, our argument is that 
the specific system-specific measures we observe shape the contracting environment but are largely 
independent of an important idiosyncratic component (i.e., the econometric error) that also contributes to 
contracting choices. 
Second, our instrumental variables strategy relies exclusively on variation in the contracting 
environment across model-systems within the same model-generation.  Our approach is to use measures 
(such as LOW CAPACITY-i) as instrumental variables for VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i, while at the 
same time controlling directly for LOW CAPACITYi.   As a practical matter, this approach only has 
empirical bite if there is variation between our instrumental variables (e.g., LOW CAPACITY-i) and our 
control variables (e.g., LOW CAPACITYi).  If a firm makes a fixed investment in contracting (e.g., 
lawyers, accountants, etc.), and under-invests in capacity in response to this investment, this would lead to 
a LOW CAPACITY = 0 for all systems within that manufacturer.  In contrast, we observe a high level of 
variation across systems within individual models, as documented in the final column of Table 1.  Of the 
19 model-years in our sample, 13 exhibit variation across systems in SUNK COST, 17 exhibit variation 
in LOW CAPACITY, and all models display variation in the PLATFORM and COMPLEXITY measures.  
                                                 
21 As the specification and integration challenges vary significantly from one model generation to another, and from 
one component to the next, the legal and transactional costs of contracting are largely independent of integration 
choices on prior product generations or other components.  For example, even when a manufacturer seeks to 
contract for a single component for two separate automobile models (e.g., an Autoliv airbag for a mid-size model 
and for a luxury model), the contracting process (and associated costs) are mostly independent:  the effort associated 
with specifying the mid-market airbag neither raises nor lowers the costs associated with the detailed contracting 
process for the feature-rich and specifications-oriented luxury version (respondent interview).  
22 While outsourcing multiple systems to a particular supplier might be expected to result in economies of scope and 
scale, this practice was only observed in practice after our sample period.  Over the past ten years, at least in part to 
take advantage of outsourcing opportunities while maintaining some level of coordination, manufacturers have 
outsourced multiple systems to Tier 1 suppliers such as Lear and Johnson Controls.  
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This means that within a specific model, some systems were low capacity and others were not.   For 
example, for one of the models, SUNK COST = 0 on suspensions and SUNK COST = 1 for engines.   
While the historic presence of an engine plant continues to lower the in-house cost for engine component 
production, pre-existing assets did not lower the costs of in-house production for suspensions relative to 
outsourcing.   We exploit this variation across systems to identify the interdependence among governance 
choices for those systems.  
Finally, as discussed in Section III, the instrumental variables framework can be adapted to (a) 
rely exclusively on variation over time within model-systems (i.e., a fixed effects or first-differences IV 
estimator), (b) exclusively on variation across model-systems (the initial conditions IV estimator or the 
between effects IV estimator), or (c) incorporate both sources of variation.  These alternative control 
structures allow us to control for distinct sources of potential correlation between the system-specific 
contracting measures and the unobserved returns to vertical integration, and to rely on different sources of 
variation within our data.    For example, while the fixed effects estimator assumes that changes in the 
contracting environment within model systems over time are uncorrelated with changes in the system-
specific returns to vertical integration, the initial conditions estimator assumes that the initial level of the 
contracting environment is exogenously given, and controls for any changes arising during our sample 
period.
23  These alternative control structures exploit distinct types of variation in the system-specific 
measures.  While SUNK COST and LOW CAPACITY primarily vary across model-systems (indeed, 
SUNK COST has no variation within a model-system over time), COMPLEXITY and PLATFORM 
exhibit variation both within model-systems over time and across model-systems.  Moreover, since we 
observe multiple system-specific contracting measures, we can evaluate how the estimates change with 
the inclusion or exclusion of individual variables, and test the exclusion restrictions implied by the model 
(i.e. a Hausman test for the exogeneity of VERTICAL INTEGRATION and an overidentification test for 
the exogeneity of the instruments).  Our empirical approach is thus justified by the use of a range of 
alternative specifications, our qualitative understanding of the origins of variation in the contracting 
environment, and our ability to exploit variation across systems within individual automobile models. 
Technology and Location Controls.  Our dataset also includes technology and location measures 
which are not predicted to have a direct impact on VERTICAL INTEGRATION but may impact the 
degree of contracting complementarity.
24    First, DESIGN GOAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an 
individual system is associated with “high” system-specific performance and design goals.  The 
                                                 
23 Moreover, the estimates of λ turn out to be quite stable across alternative identification approaches, suggesting 
that no single source of spurious correlation contaminates our main findings. 
24 While each of these measures was originally collected as instrumental variables for COMPLEXITY (discussed in 
Novak and Eppinger (2001)), they may also serve to mediate the relative importance of coordinating contracting 
choices across systems.  
20 
importance of these goals were provided by vehicle product managers, on a 0-10 scale, with 0 indicating 
no importance for product performance goals and 10 indicating that the vehicle competes based on high 
system performance.  Certain performance goals necessitate more complex product designs, such as more 
integral architectures (Ulrich, 1995).   For example, a high top-speed capability requires a body system 
consisting of tightly interconnected parts.  Since systems for which performance goals are very high are 
likely to be associated with high system-specific complexity, integration with other systems may be less 
important, and so DESIGN GOAL may reduce the importance of contracting complementarity in 
contracting choice.  Similarly, SKILL SHORTAGE (mean = .15) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
system-specific worker skills are absent within current plant locations.  For example, it is much more 
costly to produce a body design featuring many complex manual welds in an area where workers are not 
trained in advanced welding. Vehicle product managers were asked whether the absence of worker skills 
played a role in design considerations for each system.  Because SKILL SHORTAGE may constrain the 
system-specific contracting choices for individual components and systems, SKILL SHORTAGE may 
reduce the degree to which an auto manufacturer can coordinate contracting choices over systems. 
While small sample size prevents us from directly identifying complementarities between specific 
systems (e.g., engine and transmission), we can still divide the system pairs into those with a tight 
coupling during product development, and thus with significant expected complementarities,  and those 
with loose coupling during product development, where we would not expect to see resulting 
complementarities.
25  We define tight coupling as a frequent (hourly or daily vs. monthly or longer) need 
for coordination of systems i and j during product development.
26 For example, in order to make any 
major changes to suspension specifications, it is essential to check the possible effects of such changes to 
the steering system specifications to ensure their joint performance. Given this need for coordination, we 
define this pair as highly coupled and would expect to see strong complementarity between such coupled 
pairs. Of our 21 possible system pairs, we identify 14 as tightly coupled and 7 as loosely coupled.  
System, Year, and Company Fixed Effects.  We also observe a potential driver of contracting at 
the model-year level, UNION.  UNION is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if any component is 
produced in house and covered under a union agreement.  If a system is produced in a plant with a union 
agreement, the union may exert pressure to produce as much of the system in-house as possible (in order 
to ensure in-house employment).   To the extent that this pressure is successful, we expect a positive 
relationship between UNION and VERTICAL INTEGRATION (of course, we exclude this measure in 
specifications with model-year fixed effects).  Finally, we calculate fixed effects for seven automobile 
                                                 
25 We thank one of the anonymous referees for this helpful suggestion.  
26 For each system pair, company experts evaluated “high” vs. “low” coupling in terms of frequency of coordination 
need. See Steward (1981) for a discussion and methodology for identifying coupling among development tasks.   
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system (SEATS are the excluded category), three model generation dummies (the first observation for a 
given model is the excluded category) and eight company dummies (company dummies are suppressed to 
preserve confidentiality).    The empirical analysis explores each of these control structures to identify the 
variation driving the core findings and to highlight the robustness of the results to alternative sources of 
variation. 
V. Empirical  Results 
Our empirical analysis is divided into several steps.  First, we present our core findings, 
examining the sensitivity of the degree of vertical integration in any one system to the “average” vertical 
integration choice of other systems in that model.  Our instrumental variables strategy allows us to 
distinguish contracting complementarity from a firm-level “taste” for vertical integration, and to evaluate 
the robustness of this finding to alternative control structures and specifications.  We next present a 
reduced-form approach (in the spirit of Arora, 1996), examining the impact of the instrumental variables 
themselves on contracting choice. We then turn to more detailed findings, examining how the degree of 
contracting complementarity depends on factors in the contracting environment, and whether the 
interdependence among systems determines the degree of complementarity.  Though the modest size of 
the dataset makes us cautious in interpreting the findings, our results accord with a model where the 
inability to contract with external suppliers for effective coordination induces contracting 
complementarity among system-level vertical integration choices. 
An Instrumental Variables Approach to Testing for Contracting Complementarity.  We begin in 
Table 2 with two OLS regressions of VERTICAL INTEGRATION on VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i 
and our main control variables.  To account for potential correlation within model-systems over model-
generations, all standard errors in Table 2 are clustered at the model-system level.  While (2-1) includes a 
very simple specification with only two control variables (SUNK COST and LOW CAPACITY), (2-2) 
includes the complete set of control variables, including all of the system-specific contracting measures, 
system and model-generation dummy variables, and the UNION dummy.  Many of these individual 
system effects are significant (and different than each other), and LOW CAPACITY is negatively related 
to VERTICAL INTEGRATION in both specifications.  The most striking result is the quantitatively large 
and statistically significant coefficient on VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i.
27  According to these OLS 
specifications, a shift of one unit in VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i. is associated with a 14 percentage 
point increase in the VERTICAL INTEGRATION share for that system.   
                                                 
27 Though the bulk of the remaining results reflect our instrumental variables approach, the OLS findings 
highlighted in the first two columns of Table 2 are robust across a wide range of specifications.  The coefficient on 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i in a univariate regression (with a constant) is 0.143 (with a standard error of 0.021).   
Also, as reported in the first two columns of Appendices C-1, C-2 and C-3, a similar coefficient (from 0.13 to 0.15 
and always highly significant) is estimated in the context of an OLS between estimator and an OLS initial conditions 
estimator over a wide variety of specifications.  
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These OLS results may be spurious, driven by firm-specific unobservables inducing a high 
correlation among the contracting choices of the firm across systems.  We address this with an 
instrumental variables strategy.  In the final two columns of Table 2, we instrument for VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i with the sums of contracting measures such as SUNK COST or LOW CAPACITY for 
other systems within that model-year but for system i.   While the excluded instruments for (2-3) are 
LOW CAPACITY-i and SUNK COST-i, the excluded instruments for (2-3) also include PLATFORM-i 
and COMPLEXITY-i.  Except for our treatment of VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i as endogenous, (2-3) 
and (2-4) are identical to the OLS specifications in (2-1) and (2-2), respectively.  In both specifications, 
the instrumental variables coefficient on VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i is positive and significant (and 
larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficient).  While a Hausman test cannot reject the exogeneity of 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i in (2-3), the Hausman test rejects the OLS specification at the 10% level 
in the more detailed specification (2-4).
28   The overall magnitude is similar to the OLS estimates – a shift 
in the contracting environment that induces a one unit change in VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i  i s  
associated with a 15-18 percentage point increase in the predicted level of VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
for an individual system.  This result is consistent with the importance of coordination in contracting – 
namely that once an outside shock such as a change in underlying technology results in in-house 
development of a system such as the suspension, there are incremental gains to be had by locating 
development of related systems, such as the engine, in the same organization. 
These results are reinforced when we focus on specific sources of variation in Table 3.
29,30  In (3-
1), we present the results of an instrumental variables “between” estimator which relies exclusively on 
variation across models.  This estimator abstracts away from all variation within model-systems over time 
and the instrumental variables vector is calculated using the average of the system-specific contracting 
measures (e.g., SUNK COST) across all model-generations.  The estimate is consistent with our earlier 
                                                 
28 The exogeneity of the instrumental variables cannot be rejected in any of these specifications. 
29 Appendix C includes a number of robustness checks focusing on specific sources of variation, and alternative 
specifications.   Each table in Appendix C includes OLS and IV estimates for a particular specification, presenting 
the “between” estimator and the “initial conditions” estimator for that specification.  While the between estimator 
abstracts away from all variation within model-systems over time, the initial conditions estimator drops the first 
observation associated with each model-system, and estimates the sensitivity of subsequent governance choices (i.e., 
subsequent model-generations) to the contracting environment associated with the initial contracting environment.   
Our core finding – complementarity among system-level governance choices – is robust across all of these checks.   
We have also explored a range of 3SLS estimator which jointly estimates the VERTICAL INTEGRATION and 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i equations, accounting for correlation across equations and including detailed controls 
(including model-system fixed effects).  The results remain similar in magnitude and significance. 
30 In unreported specifications, the IV results are robust across a wide number of additional checks.  The results are 
similar using other system-specific measures, such as a measure of technology use and the severity of the major 
model change.  In addition, the results are robust to the use of company-specific time trends, and alternative 
treatments of partially owned suppliers and spin-offs.   Finally, the results are robust to treating the continuous 
measure VERTICAL INTEGRATION as a discrete variable (e.g., based on a “threshold” level such as .25, .5, and 
.75), and implementing an IV probit accounting for the discrete nature of the dependent variable.  
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findings, and our qualitative evidence.  For example, one model in our sample features a vehicle body 
associated with a high level of sunk costs and platform requirements throughout the sample, while its 
steering system has a low level of system-specific sunk assets and few platform requirements.  Despite 
system-specific conditions favoring outsourcing in the steering system, the majority of steering system 
components have been consistently maintained in-house, at least in part to facilitate coordination between 
the steering system and in-house body development (respondent interviews). 
The final two columns of Table 3 shift the focus towards variation within model-systems over 
time.  These IV estimators rely exclusively on whether changes in the system-specific contracting 
environment are associated with changes in the level of vertical integration.  By focusing on variation 
within model-systems, these estimators account directly for the possibility that our cross-sectional results 
may result from a spurious correlation between the system-specific contracting environment and the level 
of vertical integration.  For example, it is possible that those firms who choose a lower level of vertical 
integration (across all systems) maintain a low level of system-specific capacity and sunk assets.   While 
our qualitative evidence mitigates against this possibility, and our identification strategy relies on 
variation in the contracting environment within a given model, it is useful to examine whether our 
evidence for complementarity among governance choices depends on the cross-sectional variation in our 
dataset.  We present two alternative approaches.  While (3-2) reports the results from a model-system 
fixed effects instrumental variables estimator, (3-3) presents estimates associated with a first-differenced 
IV estimator.
31  As discussed in Section IV, while there is no variation in SUNK COSTS within model-
systems over time (and very limited variation in LOW CAPACITY), there is a considerable amount of 
“within” variation in COMPLEXITY and PLATFORM, and so our within-model-system results depend 
on the inclusion of these two measures.   Though these results focus on a very narrow form of variation 
within our dataset, the core results are similar; the coefficient on VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i is 
precisely estimated and of a similar magnitude than results relying on cross-sectional variation.   Though 
the limited size of our dataset makes us cautious in interpreting these results, the evidence suggests that 
the high level of correlation in vertical integration choices across systems does not simply reflect an 
unobserved firm-level effect but seems to be grounded in observable variation in the contracting 
environment across the different systems of a given automobile model. 
A Reduced-Form Approach to Testing for Contracting Complementarity.  Table 4 explores the 
logic further by examining how contracting for a given system is impacted by the contracting 
environment for other systems by directly including the excluded instruments from Table 2 in an OLS 
specification.  This reduced-form strategy follows Arora (1996), who derives the conditions under which 
                                                 
31 While (3-2) includes 133 observations and 49 model-system fixed effects, (3-3) uses only 84 first-differenced 
observations; both specifications include controls for model-generation.  
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a reduced-form approach to testing for complementarity in organizational design is possible.  In 
particular, our identification approach depends on measured differences in the contracting environment 
across systems within a given automobile model.  The reduced-form approach highlights this feature; if 
the correlation was driven by similarities in the environment across systems, then the instrumental 
variables would be collinear with the system-specific direct effects included in each model.
32   
In (4-1), both LOW CAPACITY and SUNK COSTS are included, as well as LOW CAPACITY-i 
and SUNK COSTS-i.  Both the direct effects of LOW CAPACITY and LOW CAPACITY-i are 
statistically and quantitatively significant (interestingly, a one-standard deviation of either variable is 
predicted to have a similar impact).  The remaining specifications, which include PLATFORM (and 
PLATFORM-i) and COMPLEXITY (and COMPLEXITY-i) display a similar pattern.  Specifically, even 
after controlling for system fixed effects and year controls, both individual direct effects (e.g. SUNK 
COST) and individual instrumental variables (e.g., SUNK COSTS-i) are individually significant.  This is 
consistent with our earlier example where an environment that favored vertical integration on the body 
system seems to have induced vertical integration on related systems such as steering.  Overall, Table 4 
suggests that correlation in contracting across systems is not simply a firm-specific effect but is related to 
variation in the contracting environment across systems within a given model-generation. 
Does the Interdependence Among Systems Depend on Technological or Locational Constraints?  
While our results so far suggest that governance choices are empirically linked, the sensitivity of the 
vertical integration choice on one system to other choices in the same model might depend on other facets 
of the environment.  In particular, our qualitative work suggests that the importance of coordination with 
other systems may matter less for decision-making when a firm faces technological or locational 
constraints.  For example, when one firm faced a lack of skills in complicated manual welding, the 
decision was made to outsource body development, despite the strong need for coordination with other in-
house systems (respondent interview).  Table 5 explores the impact of interactions between VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i and measures that might mitigate the importance of coordinated contracting.  In (5-1), 
we consider an interaction with DESIGN GOAL, under the hypothesis that coordination with other 
systems may be less important when a particular system must achieve a high level of technological 
performance.  In (5-2), we examine whether constraints on the location-specific availability of system-
specific resources (i.e., SKILL SHORTAGE = 1) reduces the relative importance of coordinated 
contracting.  For each of these specifications, we extend our instrumental variables strategy, constructing 
                                                 
32 Within our dataset, there are significant differences between the control variables Zi and the instrumental 
variables, Z-i.  On a pairwise basis, SUNK COST and S_SUNK COST are negatively correlated (ρ = -0.16), LOW 
CAPACITY and S_LOW CAPACITY are also negatively correlated (ρ = -0.38), PLATFORM and S_PLATFORM 
are essentially uncorrelated  (ρ = 0.04) and COMPLEXITY and S_COMPLEXITY are positively correlated (ρ = 
0.32).   These patterns are consistent with our earlier discussion suggesting that there exists significant within-model 
across-system variation in the observed contracting environment.  
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instruments by multiplying each system-specific vertical integration driver and the instrumental variables 
for VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i  employed in Table 2.  The results, though noisy, are suggestive.  First, 
the direct effect of VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i continues to be quantitatively and statistically 
significant across both specifications.  Turning to the interaction effects, VI-i*DESIGN GOAL is negative 
though insignificant.  While this coefficient is sometimes significant with the inclusion of additional 
variables, we present this noisy result to emphasize its limited statistical power.  On the other hand, the 
coefficient on VI-i*SKILL SHORTAGE is negative and significant.   These basic patterns are consistent 
across a wide range of specifications, including one where we include both VI-i*PERFORMANCE and 
VI-i*SKILL SHORTAGE in the same regression.  Taken together, the results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the level of complementarity might be related to the marginal returns to system-to-system 
coordination activities, a process which is more effectively conducted through joint in-house contracting. 
Does Complementarity Arise Among Systems with a High Level of Interdependency?  Finally, we 
recognize that the relative returns to effective cross-system coordination may be different for different 
systems.  For example, while the level of interaction between suspension and steering is quite high, the 
level of required coordination and interaction between body and brakes is relatively low.  We therefore 
explore whether the sensitivity of vertical integration choices on one system to vertical integration choices 
on other systems are particularly salient for those systems that are themselves highly coupled.  As 
discussed in Section IV, to examine the impact of the degree of interdependency, we group system-pairs 
into those with high and low coupling.  Among our 21 potential system-pairs, 14 are rated as Tightly 
Coupled Systems and 7 are rated as Loosely Coupled Systems.  For each system, we calculate a measure 
of the level of vertical integration for those systems that are Tightly Coupled and Loosely Coupled.
33  We 
also calculate instrumental variables for these two measures of vertical integration on other systems 
within the same model-generation.  Table 6 reports the OLS and IV estimates using this approach (these 
specifications include system and model-generation dummies, and are clustered at the model-system 
level).  While the estimate of complementarity among tightly coupled systems is significant and similar in 
magnitude to earlier results, the sensitivity to Loosely Coupled systems is insignificant, small in absolute 
value, and negative in sign.  This engineering-driven definition of the relationship among systems 
provides additional evidence for the sensitivity to governance choices across systems. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of contracting complementarity across vertical integration 
decisions in automobile product development.   Building on a detailed qualitative understanding of the 
                                                 
33 In order to make the magnitudes of the coefficients comparable with our earlier results, we calculate this measure 
as 7*(average level of vertical integration for systems with a given level of coupling).    
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potential for interdependencies in contracting decisions, we test this hypothesis using an instrumental 
variables approach that allows us to distinguish contracting complementarity from firm-level factors 
inducing correlation among the firm’s governance choices.  We find a consistent pattern of support for the 
complementarity hypothesis.  Using instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of the vertical 
integration choices for other systems within a model, the probability of vertical integration for each 
automobile system increases in share of other systems that are vertically integrated.   This finding is 
robust to the inclusion or exclusion of various control variables, and does not depend on whether we focus 
exclusively on time-series or cross-sectional variation.  The evidence in favor of complementarity turns 
out to be strongest in those environments where we expect strong interdependence among vertical 
integration choices (i.e., tightly coupled systems). 
While we interpret these findings cautiously, it is possible to draw out some implications from the 
analysis.  First, our results suggest that assuming away contracting complementarity may be problematic 
in contexts where coordination and integration activities are both important and difficult to monitor.  As 
emphasized by a number of “insider econometrics” studies (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003), organizational 
design choices are interdependent and economic analysis of individual choices in isolation are likely to be 
biased.  Second, the analysis suggests that there are empirical implications to contracting even when 
where there are no ex ante differences in the ability to write contracts but there are ex post differences in 
the ability to enforce and/or monitor agreements.  In other words, our hypothesis is a simple but novel 
implication of a model in which firms must make multiple interdependent and long-lived contracting 
choices.   Finally, the econometric framework offered by this paper offers a refinement on prior research 
emphasizing the importance of choice-specific instruments in testing for complementarity in 
organizational design.  Specifically, by collecting the data so that each choice-specific measure is 
observed in a symmetric fashion across choices, this paper proposes and implements a less ad-hoc 
instrumental variables test for complementarity in organizational design. 
These findings have a range of implications for future work.  In Novak and Stern (2007), for 
example, we explore the performance implications of vertical integration over the product development 
lifecycle.  Building on recent work in organizational economics and strategy, we investigate whether 
outsourcing may be associated with a performance premium at the earliest stages of the lifecycle (as 
external suppliers exploit their specialized capabilities in meeting the terms of initial contracts), while 
vertical integration may be associated with performance improvement over the lifecycle (as internal teams 
can be motivated even after formal contractual requirements are fulfilled).  We are able to exploit the 
instrumental variables strategy developed in this paper to account for the endogeneity of vertical 
integration within that analysis. 
As well, the analysis highlights an important distinction between the need for coordination effort  
27 
across divisional boundaries and the expropriation risk that arises when proprietary information is shared 
across firm boundaries.  While our current analysis does not allow us to disentangle these two drivers of 
contracting complementarity, identifying the drivers of interdependency among vertical integration 
decisions seems like a promising avenue.  At the same time, research should also consider how concerns 
about the formal nature of contracts interact with potential for relational contracting, within and across 
firms.  For contract theory to have empirical relevance, theory must have implications for potential 
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 Variables & Definitions 
 










Percentage of the system produced in house between 0 and 1 (1 
indicates all in-house production)  .485 .324  19 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i 
Sum of VERTICAL INTEGRATION for all systems excepting  i  on 
model j  2.910 1.495  19 
SYSTEM-SPECIFIC CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT MEASURES   
SUNK COST  Dummy = 1 if pre-existing in-house sunk costs and/or plant 
investment for system i  .128 .335  13 
LOW CAPACITY  Dummy = 1 if plant has insufficient capacity to manufacture system 
design in-house  .172 .378  17 
PLATFORM 
 
Dummy = 1 if component are designed to be used for more than one 
vehicle model  .526 .501  19 
COMPLEXITY  Degree of System Complexity, ranging from 0 to 1 (See Novak and 
Eppinger, 2001).  .415 .272  19 
DESIGN GOAL  Measure for design-oriented performance goals at the system level, 
ranging from 0 (low) to 1 (high)  .449 .309  19 
SKILL SHORTAGE  Dummy = 1 if key worker skills are missing in existing plant 
locations  .150 .359  17 
MODEL-YEAR MEASURE 
UNION  Dummy = 1if a component has been produced in-house and is 
covered under union agreement  .421 .496  0 
GENERATION X  Dummy = 1 if model-generation is equal to X, 0 else 




OLS and IV Regressions 
Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.   
  (2) Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level.   
  (3) Equation (2-3):  A Hausman test cannot reject exogeneity of VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i (p-value = 0.494).  A   
     Hausman test cannot reject exogeneity of instruments (p-value = 0.87) 
(4) Equation (2-4):  A Hausman test rejects exogeneity of VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i at the 10% level  
     (p-value = 0.089).  A Hausman test cannot reject exogeneity of instruments (p-value = 0.85) 
Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION (N=133) 
 OLS  Regressions  Instrumental Variables Regressions 
 (2-1)  (2-2)  (2-3)  (2-4) 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i        .140




       (.018)       (.023)  (.036)  (.046) 
SUNK COST  -.003        .113  -.011  .138 
  (.084)       (.093)  (.093)  (.106) 





  (.059)       (.067)  (.061)  (.069) 
PLATFORM          .018    .040 
         (.047)    (.058) 
COMPLEXITY          .085    .087 
         (.092)    (.095) 
UNION         .048    -.047 
         (.100)    (.146) 
SYSTEM AND MODEL-GENERATION  DUMMY VARIABLES 
SUSPENSION                -.414
***   -.422
*** 
              (.127)    (.119) 
BRAKES              -.131    -.139
* 
             (.083)    (.081) 
TRANSMISSION                -.139
*   -.150
* 
              (.077)    (.081) 
ENGINE   -.189
**   -.208
** 
             (.098)    (.102) 
STEERING          -.475
***   -.505
*** 
             (.095)    (.107) 
BODY        -.222
**   -.238
** 
         (.093)    (.094) 
GENERATION 2           -.007          -.006 
         (.025)         (.026) 
GENERATION 3           -.017          -.007 
         (.031)         (.031) 
GENERATION 4           -.070          -.045 
         (.066)         (.072) 
CONSTANT .106
* .257
*** .066  .183
* 
       (.058)       (.064)  (.104)  (.101) 
R
2        .472        .690     
RHS Endogenous 





For system i of model j, sum each model-
specific measure for all systems but j: 
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1,...,7





























Instrumental Variables Regressions: 














































Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.   
      (2) Robust standard errors throughout.   
      (4) Equation (3-2):  H0: μi = 0 (all fixed effects are zero) is rejected : 
     F(48,77) = 10.73; p-value = 0.00) 
 




















 (.035)  (.071)  (.076) 
SUNK COST  .148     
 (.122)     
LOW CAPACITY  -.159  .068  -.014 
 (.111)  (.068)  (.073) 
PLATFORM .036  .028  .030 
 (.072)  (.058)  (.059) 
COMPLEXITY .056  .087  .058 
 (.146)  (.074)  (.080) 
GENERATION 2     -.002   
   (.023)   
GENERATION 3     -.017  -.004 
   (.040)  (.042) 
GENERATION 4     -.035  -.019 
   (.071)  (.081) 
UNION .228
*   
 (.118)     
CONSTANT -.089 .013  -.003 
 (.217)  (.221)  (.021) 
Parametric Restrictions   #Restr      F-Stat  p-value     
SYSTEM DUMMIES  6  33.80 0.00     
          σu   .238  .257 
          σε   .110  .151 
          ρ  
(% variance due to μi) 
 .822  .742 
RHS Endogenous 





For system i of model j, sum each model-specific measure for all systems but j: 
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Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION (N=133) 
    (4-1)  (4-2) 
SUNK COST         .027  .244*** 
        (.067)  (.089) 
LOW CAPACITY        -.338***  -.103*** 
        (.062)  (.090) 
PLATFORM   .043 
   (.050) 
COMPLEXITY   .163 
   (.089) 
S_ SUNK COST-i         .040  .125* 
       (.060)  (.068) 
S_LOW CAPACITY-i        -.212***  .041 
        (.050)  (.081) 
S_ PLATFORM-i  .0002 
   (.021) 
S_ COMPLEXITY-i   .073** 
   (.037) 
Parametric Restrictions     #Restr      F-Stat  p-value 
COMPANY DUMMIES         7      24.18      .000 
SYSTEM DUMMIES         6        5.55      .000 
GENERATION DUMMIES           3        4.46      .008 
Constant         .729***  .283* 
        (.088)  (.176) 
R
2         .234  .588 
Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.     
      (2) Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level.   




Instrumental Variable Regressions: 
Interaction Terms 
  
Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION  (N=133) 
 (5-1)  (5-2) 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i         .233
***  .183
*** 
        (.067)  (.037) 
VI-i*DESIGN GOAL         -.111 
 
        (.082)   
VI-i*SKILL SHORTAGE    -.062
** 
   (.030) 
SUNK COST         .118  .159
* 
        (.094)  (.096) 
LOW CAPACITY        -.174
*** -.185
** 
        (.066)  (.079) 
PLATFORM         .053  .011 
        (.062)  (.050) 
COMPLEXITY         .105  .088 
        (.090)  (.086) 
DESIGN GOAL         .089   
        (.235)   
SKILL SHORTAGE    .210
*** 
   (.103) 
UNION        -.109  -.029 
        (.147)  (.121) 
Parametric Restrictions   #Restr      F-Stat  p-value   #Restr      F-Stat  p-value 
SYSTEM DUMMIES         6        6.27      .000         6        4.80      .000 
GENERATION DUMMIES         3        0.12      .946         3        0.22      .883 
Constant         .136  .181
** 
        (.169)  (.081) 
RHS Endogenous Variables  VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i 
VI -i*DESIGN GOAL 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i 
VI-i*SKILL SHORTAGE 
Instrumental Variables  For system i of model j, sum of  each 
model-specific measure for all 





























For system i of model j, sum of  each 
model-specific measure for all 




























Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.     
      (2) Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level.   
   (3)  VI-i abbreviates VERTICAL INTEGRATION-i 
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TABLE 6 
Testing the Impact of the Degree of Complementarity 
  
Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION (N=133) 
 
  (6-1) 
OLS Estimator 
(6-2) 
Instrumental Variables Estimator 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
(TIGHTLY COUPLED 
SYSTEMS)-i         .127
***  .170
** 
        (.032)  (.078) 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
(LOOSELY COUPLED 
SYSTEMS)-i          -.002  -.007
 
        (.020)  (.054) 
SUNK COST         .093  .111
 
        (.080)  (.086) 
LOW CAPACITY        -.142
** -.137
** 
        (.058)  (.057) 
PLATFORM         -.006  .009 
        (.047)  (.059) 
COMPLEXITY         .065  -.058 
        (.088)  (.093) 
UNION        .047  -.060 
        (.096)  (.140) 
Parametric Restrictions   #Restr      F-Stat  p-value   #Restr      F-Stat  p-value 
SYSTEM DUMMIES         6        5.61      .000         6        4.44      .001 
GENERATION DUMMIES         3        0.10      .957         3        0.04      .989 
Constant         .269  .191
** 
        (.070)  (.114) 
R-squared .697   
RHS Endogenous Variables   
VERTICAL INTEGRATION (TIGHTLY 
COUPLED SYSTEMS)-i 
  
VERTICAL INTEGRATION (LOOSELY 
COUPLED SYSTEMS)-i 
Instrumental Variables    For system i of model j, sums of  each 
model-specific measure for all systems but j 
which are coupled at coupling level k (k 
either TIGHT OR LOOSE) 
 



















Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.     
      (2) Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level.   




A Model of Contracting Complementarity 
This section develops a simple model of contracting complementarity even when the ex ante cost 
of specifying contracts is the same whether or not the system is outsourced.  We link complementarity to 
specific features of the contracting environment, identifying the economic forces giving rise to 
contracting complementarity when the firm makes multiple vertical integration decisions across 
(interdependent) functional activities.  Rather than develop a complete multilateral bargaining model, this 
“reduced-form” model assumes how the value of internal and external contracting depends on other 
aspects of the contracting environment.  In so doing, we highlight the impact of multi-dimensional effort 
supply and trade secrecy concerns on contracting complementarity.  
 
The Firm’s Objective Function 
We consider a simple production environment where the automobile producer (the “firm”) must 
contract for the development of two automobile systems, A and B, in order to produce a new automobile 
model.  While system-specific performance is important, overall performance also depends on the level of 
system-to-system coordination.  Effective coordination imposes additional costs on the firm, and some of 
these costs depend on the chosen vertical structure.  We assume that a higher level of coordination can be 
achieved by inducing a higher level of (non-contractible) coordination effort and/or by the disclosure of 
crucial model-level design details to each team.  However, these benefits are traded off against a lower 
level of system-specific effort and an increased probability that trade secrets are publicly revealed.   
Total profits depend on the performance of each system ( and
AB f f ), the degree of coordination 
between the systems (
I f ) and whether the design remains a secret ( () c θ ).  System-specific performance 
is a function of the level of system-specific effort, which depends on whether the system is outsourced or 
not and the incentive scheme employed by the firm.  For each system i, let yi = 0 be defined as an 
outsourced team and yi = 1 as in-house development.  Moreover, the firm can choose to implement an 
explicit or subjective incentive scheme for each system.  Let xi = 0 be defined as employing explicit 
incentive scheme for agents responsible for system i and xi = 1 a subjective performance evaluation 
scheme.  Further, the firm can improve the degree of integration by disclosing design choices to both 
teams (d = 1; 0 else).   Finally, for 
i f , let Zi be exogenous factors impacting the returns to i.  This 
structure yields the following total profit function: 
(,; ) (,; ) (,,,, ;) ( (,, ) )
ABI
AAA BBB ABAB I AB f xyZ f xyZ fxxyyd Z c yyd θ Π= + + −  
For each system, performance depends on the pre-existing capability level of the team chosen, the 
system-specific effort level, and a random component.  As such, our approach differs implicitly from the 
theoretical literature insofar as we are assuming that one cannot acquire external teams.  In other words,   
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pre-existing system-specific sunk investments or capabilities that have historically maintained by the firm 
internally predispose the firm to continue in-house production. 
Moreover, the system-specific effort level (
SS
i e )  depends on the chosen incentive scheme and 
whether the system is outsourced or not, resulting in the following expression for system-specific 
performance: 
SS
i ( ) + e ( , ) +  ( {0,1}; {0,1})
ii yy
ii i i i i i fh Z x y x y η =∈ ∈   
There will be variation across model-systems as to whether external or in-house teams have a greater pre-
existing capability level (or current capacity to complete the work).  Indeed, this form of variation – 
factors impacting system-level performance but unrelated to the interdependencies among systems – is 
the key to the empirical identification strategy described in Section IV. 
For simplicity, we assume that the benefits from increased coordination can be separably 
decomposed into the benefits arising from the interaction between the incentive scheme and the 
outsourcing choice (
I
x f ), and the benefits from a higher level of disclosure (
I
d f ).  The benefits to 
coordination,
I
x f , is sensitive to the level of coordination effort by each team ( ,,
INT
i ei A B = ).  Because 
effective coordination depends on interactions between the parties, we specify the net benefits from 
integration effort as the product of the coordination effort by each team: 
,
( , ) ( {0,1}; {0,1})
II N T
xi i i i i
iA B
fe x y x y
=
=∈ ∈ ∏  
As well, beyond a baseline level, effective coordination depends on disclosure (d = 1), the 
benefits of which may depend on specific features of the product development environment (
I
d Z ) but are 
independent of the chosen ownership structure (
II
dd f dZ =   ).  However, the probability that model-level 
design information is disclosed to competitors , θ, increases from  θL to θH when d = 1 and either yA = 0 or 
yB = 0.  In other words, in the case where the integration benefit is realized, the disclosure probability 
depends on whether at least one of the systems is outsourced.
34  Taken together, these assumptions yield 








ii i i i i d A B H L xxyyd
iA B iA B
Max h Z x y e x y d Z d y y c c θθ
= =
Π= + + − − − ∑ ∏    
Incentives, the Contracting Environment and Effort Supply 
Optimal contracting and incentive scheme choices are based on the relative benefits of in-house 
versus supplier development and how these choices interact with the potential costs of disclosure.  For 
each development team, the firm chooses between an explicit and subjective incentive scheme.  While the 
                                                 
34 The baseline probability of disclosure is greater than zero in order to be consistent with the idea that disclosure 
itself is non-contractible, as the “source” of competitive intelligence cannot be verified.   As well, while the current 
model assumes that the potential for expropriation does not increase when both teams are outsourced (relative to 
θH), we can accommodate this extension as long as  ( 1 , 0 , 0 )( ) ( )( ) AB H H L cd y y c c c θ θθ θ === − ≤ − .  
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explicit scheme is contract-based and payoffs are contingent on observable and verifiable criteria, the 
subjective scheme depends on “soft” information across a wider range of dimensions (Baker, Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1994; 2002; Levin, 2003).  We assume that explicit contract terms can only be provided for 
system-specific performance measures, and the ability to contract on the degree of coordination is limited 
by the absence of verifiable information.  As mentioned earlier, even though formal contracts in the 
automobile industry do specify that coordination requirements, the inability to document the source of 
failure over a coordination issue limits the effectiveness of formal contracts for this purpose.  In other 
words, while the ex ante costs of writing contract specifications is the same for in-house and external 
teams, ex post differences in the contracting environment lead to differences in the effort levels of in-
house versus external teams under each incentive scheme. 
Under an identical explicit incentive scheme, external teams will provide a higher equilibrium 
level of system-specific effort than in-house teams.  This difference arises because performance is 
observed with a long lag, and the terms of contracting are subject to renegotiation when performance is 
observed.
35  Once performance is observed, external suppliers can expect to have little bargaining power, 
as they will likely have no ongoing contractual relationship with the firm.
36  As such, when contract 
specifications are not met (e.g., a verifiable system-specific failure occurs), the manufacturer can (and 
will) enforce whatever contractual penalties are specified.  By writing an enforceable contract with severe 
penalties in the case of system failure, the firm can induce a high level of system-specific effort by 
choosing an external supplier.  Auto manufacturers and their suppliers can (and do) litigate disputes 
through arbitration or formal litigation on a regular basis.  In contrast, enforcing severe penalties against 
in-house product development teams is more difficult.  By the time performance is observed, team 
members will be working on new projects for the firm; as a result, the threat of hold-up counter-balances 
the threat of penalties by the firm.  The continuing involvement of the in-house teams with the firm 
reduces the ability of the firm to commit to explicit contract-based penalties associated with system 
failure.
37   As a result, even though the ex ante costs of specifying contracts is identical, the equilibrium 
level of system-specific effort will be lower for in-house development teams under 
( (0,0) (0,1 ), ,
SS SS
ii ee i A B >= ).  Further, because coordination effort is non-contractible, employing an 
explicit incentive scheme limits the ability to induce effort towards coordination, and there is no 
difference in the level of effort devoted by an in-house or external team.   For simplicity, we normalize 
                                                 
35 More precisely, the timing associated with observing a failure is uncertain, as it depends on the accumulation of 
user evidence (e.g., consumer complaints, crash rates, etc.).  The assumption is that the expected ability to 
renegotiate contracts differs across in-house versus external suppliers at the time of initial contracting. 
36 Typically, time between major changes is 3-5 years, and it is unlikely that the same supplier is working on a new 
project for the same manufacturer in the same vehicle segment at the time when failure is observed. 
37 Moreover, the ability to specify performance incentives for individual employees is limited by the fact that (a) 
employees are dispersed throughout the firm and so the cost of enforcing provisions may have a large impact on 
projects throughout the firm and (b) individual liquidity constraints constrain the ability of the firm to specify 
monetary damages of the type that are routinely used in supplier contracts.  
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the level of coordination effort under explicit incentives to 0 for both in-house and external teams (i.e., 
(1,0) (1,1) 0
INT INT
ii ee == ). 
In contrast to an explicit incentive contract, a subjective incentive scheme can induce effort along 
both dimensions, even though coordination effort is non-contractible.   More specifically, the firm can use 
the potential for repeated interaction to establish relational contracts inducing effort on dimensions over 
which managers can make (non-verifiable) inferences about the level of effort (Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1994; 2002; Levin, 2003).  Inducing effort on non-contractible dimensions comes at the expense 
of high-powered incentive contracting on dimensions for which contracting is feasible; as a result, for a 
given team (in-house or external), the equilibrium level of system-specific effort is lower under subjective 
relative to explicit incentives ( (0, .) (1, .)
SS SS
ii ee > ).   However, relative to an external team, an in-house 
team provides a higher level of coordination effort under subjective incentives than an external team: 
(1, 0) (1, 1)










Those factors limiting the ability of the firm to enforce formal contract terms against in-house employees 
are precisely those which allow the firm to implement relational contracting.  For example, while a long-
term employment relationship with the firm limits the power of formal contracts (because of the potential 
for hold-up), this relationship allows the firm to use subjective promotion decisions to induce effort on 
non-contractible dimensions.  While relational contracting across firms may also be feasible (as 
emphasized in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002)), the effectiveness of inter-firm subjective contracting 
is limited – relative to what is achievable for employees within the firm -- by the lower probability of a 
repeated relationship across firm boundaries.
38 
Finally, we also assume that the firm cannot specify specific penalties for trade secrecy 
violations; while an occasional instance of industrial espionage will result in a supplier being caught “red-
handed,” most expropriation occurs without the firm’s knowledge and with few clues as to the precise 
source of the disclosure of competitive intelligence. 
 
Optimal Contracting, Disclosure and Complementarity 
  The firm simultaneously chooses whether to vertically integrate each product development team, 
the incentive scheme to provide each team, and whether to facilitate coordination through disclosure.  
Interdependencies across vertical choices arise through the coordination effort decisions and through the 
disclosure decision.   
Proposition 1:   ( , , , , )is supermodular in x , , , , and d. ABAB ABAB xxyyd xyy Π  
                                                 
38 If overall effort supply is inelastic, it is possible that  (1, 0) (1, 1)
SS SS
ii ee > .  This does not change the overall 
analysis as long as subjective incentives are pairwise complements with in-house production.    
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Proof of Proposition 1:  The proof proceeds by showing pairwise complementarity among each of the 
choice variables.  Letting  i Δ  refer to the difference in Π  from shifting i from 0 to 1 (and  ij Δ is 
analogously the double-difference operator), we need to show that  
p a i r s ( , ) { ,,,, } ,
0 ,,,,
ABAB
ij i j A B A B
ij x x y y d
x xyyd
∀∈
Δ− Δ− Δ> ∀
 
We begin with the pair ( , AA x y ).  Since d does not interact with xA, we abstract away from the level of d.  
As well, when  0, 0 , , .
I
Bx A A B x fx y y == ∀  In the case when  0, B x = we thus need only show 
(1,1) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0,1) 0
SS SS SS SS
AA AA ee ee +−−> .  This follows from two observations: 
   (1,1) (1, 0)
SS SS
AA ee >  (in-house subjective effort is higher than external subjective effort) 
   (0,1) (0,0)
SS SS
AA ee < (in-house explicit effort is lower than external explicit effort). 
When  1, B x =  we also consider whether  
(1, .) *( (1, 1) (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1)) 0
INT INT INT INT INT
BAA A A eee ee +−− > .   
Complementarity among ( , AA x y ) is ensured because  (0,0) (0,1) 0
INT INT
AA ee = = , .  An identical 
argument holds for ( , BB x y ). 
We next consider ( , AB yy ).  When  A x  or  B x  = 0 and d = 0, there is no interaction between  ( , AB yy ).  
When  A x  and  B x  = 1 (maintaining d = 0) , we must determine the sign of: 
(1,1) (1,1) (1, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0) (1,1) (1,1) (1, 0).
INT INT INT INT INT INT INT INT
A B AB AB A B ee ee ee ee +− − 
This can be rewritten as: 
(1,1) ( (1,1) (1, 0)) (1, 0) ( (1,1) (1, 0))
INT INT INT INT INT INT
AB B A B B ee e ee e −− − 
which can be further rewritten as: 
( (1, 1) (1, 0) ) ( (1, 1) (1, 0))
INT INT INT INT
AA BB ee ee −−  
Each of these terms is positive by assumption since in-house subjective incentives induce higher effort than 
external subject incentives.  Finally, when d = 1, we must also consider the term  ()() H L cc θ θ − , which 
is also positive by assumption, yielding complementarity between ( , AB yy ). 
We next consider ( , AB x y ).  When  0, B x = there is no interaction between these two variables.  Assuming  
1, B x = we can write the inequality for complementarity as: 
( 1 , . )( 1 , 1 ) ( 0 , . )( 1 , 0 ) ( 0 , . )( 1 , 1 ) ( 1 , . )( 1 , 0 ) 0
INT INT INT INT INT INT INT INT
A B AB AB A B ee ee ee ee +− −>  
Since  (0,.) 0
INT
A e = , this reduces to  (1, .) ( (1,1) (1, 0)) 0
INT INT INT
AB B ee e − >  which follows from the 
assumption that in-house subject incentives induce higher effort than external subjective incentives.  An 
identical argument holds for ( , BA x y ). 
We now consider complementarity between ( , AB x x ), or the sign of the following: 
( 1 , . )( 1 , . ) ( 0 , . )( 1 , . ) ( 1 , . )( 0 , . ) ( 0 , . )( 0 , . ) 0
INT INT INT INT INT INT INT INT
AB A B AB A B ee ee ee ee +−−>  
This inequality is strict because  (0,.) (0,.) 0,
INT INT
AB ee = =  and  (1, .) 0
INT
i e > . 
The final pairwise complementarity to check is ( , A yd ).  The complementarity inequality for this pair 
reduces simply to (1 )( ( ) ( )) 0 AH L yc c θ θ −− ≥  which holds by assumption about the costs of 
disclosure. 
 
There are two distinct drivers of complementarity among vertical integration choices in this model.  First, 
because coordination requires interaction (and so coordination efforts are complements) and in-house 
development teams are more sensitive to subjective incentive schemes that induce a positive level of 
coordination effort, the contracting choices for the two teams become interdependent.  In other words, 
contracting complementarity results because the benefits of coordination are sensitive to the least effort  
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provided, and the level of coordination effort is sensitive to the vertical integration choice.  As well, 
contracting complementarity arises because of the non-contractibility of the trade secrecy clause and the 
fact that the probability of expropriation increases most steeply with the first instance of external 
contracting.    Another interpretation of this second channel for contracting complementarity is that the 
types of investments to ensure against expropriation result in economies of scale in outsourcing; the 
marginal “costs” of external governance are declining in the level of external governance. 
Simplifying notation so that Zi are system-specific factors favoring vertical integration for system 
i,  Proposition 1 implies the comparative statics motivating the empirical strategy: 
Remark:  
**** * , , , , and d ABAB xxyy  are weakly increasing in ZA and ZB, and weakly decreasing in 
ZD  and  ()() H L cc θ θ − . 
Proof:  Since each of the exogenous variables has a monotone relationship with each of the yi, the 
comparative statics with respect to Zi and  ()() H L cc θ θ − are a direct consequence of Milgrom 


















           
SUNK COST  -.01  1.00             
LOW CAPACITY  -.25*  .30*  1.00           
PLATFORM .07  .05  -.00  1.00         
COMPLEXITY -.15  .02 -.11  -.13  1.00       
UNION .55*  .22*  -.15  .17  -.31*  1.00     
DESIGN GOAL  -.13  -.14  -.17 -.10  .24*  -.23*  1.00   
SKILL SHORTAGE  -.26*  .47*  .59* .10  -.06  -.02  -.14  1.00 





BETWEEN ESTIMATORS AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ESTIMATORS 
(BOTH OLS AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES) 
PRE-EXISTING CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES SPECIFICATION 
Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.   
(2) Equation (C1-1) and (C1-3):  Standard errors are unadjusted as procedure is at the model-system level. 
(3) Equation (C1-2) and (C1-4):  Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level. 
(4) Equation (C1-2) and (C1-4):  Z0 is the initial value for the system-specific measure Z for a given model-system  
      (Z is either SUNK COST or LOW CAPACITY).  The initial observation for each model-system is dropped so that 
      the initial conditions estimators relies exclusively on variation across models in the level of pre-existing capabilities 
      and resources prior to the time of the first vertical integration contracting choice for that model-system. 
 
  
Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION 









(N = 84) 
(C1-3) 
Between IV Estimator
(N = 133,  
49 groups) 
(C1-4) 
Initial Conditions IV 
Estimator 
(N = 84) 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i        .138




       (.023)       (.022)  (.029)  (.034) 
SUNK COST  .022    .011   
 (.115)    (.116)   
LOW CAPACITY  -.192
**   -.180
*  
 (.098)    (.099)   
SUNK COST0          .017    .008 
         (.072)    (.084) 
LOW CAPACITY0          -.217
***   -.209 
         (.062)    (.065) 
CONSTANT .107
* .142
* .062  .079 
       (.072)       (.077)  (.087)  (.105) 
R
2 Within        .016       
R
2 Between        .498       
R
2 Overall        .470  .440     
RHS Endogenous 





For system i of model j, sum each model-
specific measure for all systems but j: 
                      
,,
1,...,7






























BETWEEN ESTIMATORS AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ESTIMATORS 
(BOTH OLS AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES) 
DESIGN AND MANUFACUTING CHALLENGE INDICES 
Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.   
(2) Equation (C2-1) and (C2-3):  Standard errors are unadjusted as procedure is at the model-system level. 
(3) Equation (C2-2) and (C2-4):  Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level. 
(4) Equation (C2-2) and (C2-4):  Z0 is the initial value for the system-specific measure Z for a given model-system  
     (Z is either PLATFORM or COMPLEXITY).  The initial observation for each model-system is dropped so that 
      the initial conditions estimators relies exclusively on variation across models in the level of design and  
      manufacturing challenges prior to the time of the first vertical integration contracting choice for that model-system. 
Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION 









(N = 84) 
(C2-3) 
Between IV Estimator
(N = 133,  
49 groups) 
(C2-4) 
Initial Conditions IV 
Estimator 
(N = 84) 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i        .146




       (.024)       (.025)  (.061)  (.039) 
PLATFORM .038    .042   
 (.073)    (.075)   
COMPLEXITY .038   .082   
 (.157)    (.177)   
PLATFORM0          .089    .102 
         (.078)    (.082) 
COMPLEXITY0          .164    .240 
         (.137)    (.159) 
CONSTANT .019  -.056  -.089  -.219 
       (.118)       (.108)  (.217)  (.173) 
R
2 Within        .074       
R
2 Between        .456       
R
2 Overall        .447  .404     
RHS Endogenous 





For system i of model j, sum each model-
specific measure for all systems but j: 
                      
,,
1,...,7





























BETWEEN ESTIMATORS AND INITIAL CONDITIONS ESTIMATORS 
(BOTH OLS AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES) 
FULL SPECIFICATION 
Notes:   (1) Stars denote 1 (***), 5 (**), and 10% (*) statistical significance level.   
(2) Equation (C3-1) and (C3-3):  Standard errors are unadjusted as procedure is at the model-system level. 
(3) Equation (C3-2) and (C3-4):  Standard errors are clustered at the model-system level. 
(4) Equation (C3-2) and (C3-4):  Z0 is the initial value for the system-specific measure Z for each model-system  
Dependent Variable : VERTICAL INTEGRATION 








(N = 84) 
(C3-3) 
Between IV Estimator 
(N = 133,  
49 groups) 
(C3-4) 
Initial Conditions IV 
Estimator 
(N = 84) 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION-i        .148




       (.026)       (.031)  (.035)  (.033) 
SUNK COST  .135    .148   
 (.120)    (.122)   
LOW CAPACITY  -.162    -.159   
 (.110)    (.111)   
PLATFORM .025    .036   
 (.070)    (.072)   
COMPLEXITY .063    .056   
 (.144)    (.146)   
SUNK COST0          .151    .168 
         (.096)    (.103) 
LOW CAPACITY0          -.228
***   -.225
*** 
         (.067)    (.071) 
PLATFORM0          -.019    .005 
         (.056)    (.057) 
COMPLEXITY0          .187    .204 
         (.166)    (.171) 
UNION  .008        .065  .228
*  -.010 
  (.091)       (.095)  (.118)  (.105) 




#Restr F-Stat p-value#Restr F-Stat p-value
SYSTEM DUMMIES  6  5.60     0.00 6  4.67  0.00 6 33.80 0.00 6  4.82  0.00
GENERATION DUMMIES       2  0.06  0.94    2  0.04    0.96
CONSTANT .269
**  .230 -.089  .148 
       (.110)       (.148)  (.217)  (.143) 
R
2 Within        .021       
R
2 Between        .745       
R
2 Overall        .683  .692     





For system i of model j, sum each model-
specific measure for all systems but j: 
                      
,,
1,...,7
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